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Abstract 
Public sector reforms aimed at ´making the managers manage´, granted public 
managers autonomy and tried to depoliticize the administration. There is substantial 
variation in the degree of direct politicization and in managerial autonomy. This article 
tests four sets of hypotheses to explain variation in perceptions of direct politicization 
and managerial autonomy in European public sectors. Data from a new survey in 15 
countries among several thousands of top public sector managers in central government 
are used. Findings show that variation in perceived direct politicization and managerial 
autonomy is partially determined by the formal status of an organization as agency, and 
the hierarchical position of the manager within the organization. Managers from very 
large organizations also experience more autonomy, but organization size has no impact 
on perceived politicization. The policy field within which the respondent´s organization 
is situated has mixed effects. The article also finds that the models are better at 
explaining the variation in perceived managerial autonomy than that in direct 
politicization. 
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Introduction  
Public administration reforms initiated in the 1980s and 1990s had the dual 
objective of depoliticizing the senior civil service and granting senior public managers 
more managerial autonomy. ´Letting the managers manage´ means freeing them from 
political interference in managerial decisions, but also granting them the autonomy 
from superior bodies to manage their organization (Kettl, 1997; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 
2004; Bezes and Jeannot, 2017). NPM reforms have meant that public organizations 
and their managers have been granted more autonomy, both vertically through a 
decentralization of decisions on administrative matters to (line) managers, and 
horizontally through structural reconfigurations such as the establishment of 
autonomies agencies (Van de Walle, 2016). According to this logic, managers are 
recruited for their skills in running government operations, rather than for their political 
feel or party affiliation.  
The objectives of the NPM were not just about ´a decrease in political control 
and increasing administrative influence and institutional autonomy´ (Christensen & 
Laegreid, 2001: 74), but just as much about reasserting political control over the 
administration. Suleiman (2003), but also many others, have argued a move to NPM 
went together with deprofessionalization of the bureaucracy and politicization, while 
Dahlström & Pierre (2011) found that politicization has also been used as a coordination 
strategy when public organizations have high autonomy.  
Far from converging to a managerialist and purely merit-driven system at the 
top of modern public administrations, wide country-level, organization-level and 
individual-level variety continues to exist in the extent of direct politicization and 
managerial autonomy in government organizations. The purpose of this article is to 
scrutinizing the linkage between structural factors and managerial autonomy and direct 
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politicization as perceived by top public managers in European countries, using a novel 
dataset. As such, the article wants to contribute empirically to the literature on 
politicization and autonomy. It also wants to provide public sector reformers with 
information about which parts of central government and which managers experience 
most politicization and experience the least autonomy. From this, recommendations for 
structural solution can be derived. 
 
The article first reviews the literature on direct politicization and patronage as 
well as managerial autonomy in European public sectors following public 
administration reforms, with a particular focus on empirical work that has compared 
organizations and countries. It then develops four sets of hypotheses to explain variation 
in direct politicization and managerial autonomy in central government organizations. 
Subsequently, the data is introduced and descriptive data is presented, followed by two 
regression models. Findings are discussed and conclusions are drawn both on the 
variation of politicization and that of managerial autonomy. 
 
Explaining individual-level variation in perceived politicization and managerial 
autonomy 
The strict separation between politics and administration, or between steering 
and rowing in the NPM discourse, reflects a belief in the existence of a politics-
administration dichotomy. This approach certainly has analytic value, yet is not very 
good at reflecting realities on the field (Svara, 2011: Spence, 1997). Especially at the 
strategic level of public organizations, there tends to be a merging or conflation of 
political and management activities. This has been called the ´purple zone´, located in 
between the blue zone of politics and the red zone of career public managers (Bellò & 
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Spano, 2015; Alford et al. 2016), where managerial autonomy and direct politicization 
or patronage come in many variations. This is why studying perceptions of top public 
managers is important and worthwhile.  
The purpose of this article is to explain variation in politicization and managerial 
autonomy in public sector organizations in Europe, as perceived by top public sector 
managers. The focus of most current research on determinants of politicization and 
managerial autonomy has been on the organizational level (do organizations have 
autonomy, and are organizations politicized), rather than on individual-level variance. 
Where such individual-level studies have been conducted (see e.g. Lonti, 2005), these 
tended to have rather low explanatory power, partly due to the limited availability of 
independent variables. In addition, the focus of much of the current research has been 
on formal and country-level determinants such as the nature of the political system or 
political culture, or the legal status of an organization. Explanatory approaches that 
focus on individual-level variance in perceived managerial autonomy and direct 
politicization are scarce. The analysis in the current article will test a number of 
explanations for the individual-level variation in perceived managerial autonomy and 
direct politicization.  
Before turning to the hypotheses, we first introduce the key concepts. When 
organization have autonomy this means there is a ´ primacy of managerial practices over 
bureaucracy´ (Verhoest et al., 2010: 6), and that the organization is able to work with 
limited external constraints (Maggetti, 2007). . Part of the motivation to establish 
agencies, where they did not already exist, was to depoliticize public tasks (James & 
Van Thiel, 2011; Majone, 2001). This is not only useful for public organizations 
themselves, but it may also create credibility for the politicians who in this way signal 
that they will refrain from interfering. Grønnegaard Christensen (2001: 119) argues that 
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granting autonomy to the bureaucracy is also a strategy for politicians to reduce political 
uncertainty, and to deflect blame when things go wrong (Hood, 2010; James et al., 
2016). In this article we use the perceived managerial autonomy as dependent variable 
to mean the extent of autonomy managers perceive to have in making decisions about 
issues such budget allocations, hiring and firing, or contracting out. Managerial 
autonomy refers to autonomy in ´the choice and use of input´ (Verhoest et al., 2004: 
105). This concerns production factors such as HR, finance, organization, housing or 
logistics (Verhoest et al. 2004). Managerial autonomy is one of six dimensions of 
organizational autonomy as defined by Verhoest et al. (2004).  
Politicization is a method for reducing information asymmetry and exercising 
control, and for patronage (Gherghina & Kopecký, 2016). Bauer and Ege define it as 
´the substitution of neutrality by introducing political (i.e. non-meritocratic and – given 
the policy dossiers at stake – non-objective) considerations into the decision-making 
process´ (2012: 408). There are different types of politicization, for instance direct and 
formal, through appointing people for political reasons (Rouban, 2003; Peters & Pierre, 
2004: 2), or professional and functional politicization which refers to the actual 
behaviors of civil servants, more in particular their responsiveness to the politicians´ 
policy position. The former can of course be used to achieve the latter (Bauer & Ege, 
2012). The focus in this article is on direct politicization through bureaucratic 
appointments. 
 
There is considerable variation in how public managers perceive their 
managerial autonomy and the extent of politicization in their organization. We 
formulate hypotheses which put forward a number of competing claims related to the 
individual and organizational context of the respondent. This study does not look at 
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broader system characteristics that are commonly used to explain country variation in 
direct politicization or managerial autonomy because our focus is not in the first place 
to explain country variation. Also, the nature of the survey data used in this article did 
not allow us to collect information on the exact political context of the respondents´ 
organizations, due to confidentiality reasons. 
 
First, structural explanations are important. For public organizations that have 
agency status devolution has presumably been intentional in order to depoliticize 
executive tasks and to allow them to operate autonomously devoid from burdensome 
bureaucratic controls. It is thus to be expected that public managers working for 
agencies report more managerial autonomy and less politicization (Yesilkagit & Van 
Thiel, 2008; Di Mascio, 2013). Despite considerable difference in how much autonomy 
is actually granted to agencies (Van Thiel, 2012) or differences in when these agencies 
have been founded, this has been confirmed in earlier work by Kopecký et al. (2016) 
for politicization, or by Lonti (2005) and Hall et al. (2011) for autonomy. Egeberg and 
Trondal (2009) also found that agency officials pay less attention to political signals, 
than those working for (ministerial) departments. More recent explanatory work on 
politicization found that political appointments are more common in ministries than in 
agencies (Kopecký et al., 2012). This is confirmed by a 2016 study by Kopecký et al. 
that also found lower politicization in executing institutions as compared to ministries. 
Kopecký et al. (2016: 421) for this reason recommended scholars pay attention to 
institutional types in future research on politicization. This brings us to the following 
hypotheses: 
H1a: Public sector managers working in agencies perceive lower direct 
politicization. 
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H1b: Public managers working in agencies perceive having higher managerial 
autonomy. 
 
A second structural factor is organization size. It is difficult for political 
principals to micromanage and keep control of all managerial decisions in large 
organizations. Size also gives organizations managerial capacity as well as political 
clout to claim their autonomy. We thus expect high managerial autonomy for large 
organizations. At the same time, their size also means organizations can no longer lead 
a quiet life, and that they become subject to more scrutiny (Verhoest et al., 2011: 215), 
or that they become a more desirable political spoil. The information asymmetry 
between principal and agent that arises as a result of size may also increase the political 
principal´s need to politically appoint officials in order to control the agent. Lioukas et 
al. (1993), who studied perceptions of managerial autonomy among Greek SOEs, 
found, amongst others, that factors such as political visibility and organization size 
increased the likelihood of intense controls. Van Thiel et al. (2012: 421), however, 
suggested that in case of organizations with high salience and big budgets de facto 
political control often goes hand in hand with high managerial autonomy. Based on 
these findings, we formulate the following hypotheses:  
H2a: Public sector managers working in large organizations perceive higher 
direct politicization. 
H2b: Public managers working in large organizations perceive higher 
managerial autonomy. 
 
Size is related to visibility, but visibility of an organization is not entirely 
determined by its size. Earlier scholarship has concentrated on the (political) visibility 
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of organizations and suggested that low visibility leads to high autonomy (Hall et al., 
2011). Lonti (2005) found that agencies in the periphery enjoy more autonomy than 
those in the core. Likewise, Antonsen and Jørgensen (1997) surveyed Danish state 
organizations and found that high publicness is associated with low autonomy. We 
assume that politicians will not bother much about organizations in very technical 
policy areas, because these lack salience. In agency research, Verhoest et al. (2011: 
215) predicted that agencies in the area of welfare and social policy are more politically 
salient, because of their direct effect on citizens, and will therefore be granted less 
autonomy. Hall et al. (2011: 29) suggested that agencies that work ´in the shadow of 
topical and controversial policy issues´ are more likely to have autonomy. We thus 
expect lower direct politicization and higher managerial autonomy in more technical 
policy areas, and higher direct politicization and lower autonomy in less technical and 
presumably more politically salient fields, where policies have immediate and visible 
impact. This is especially the case for welfare-related policy areas (Verhoest et al., 
2011: 215).  
H3a: Public managers working in welfare-related fields, will perceive higher 
direct politicization and lower managerial autonomy. 
H3b: Public managers working in technical policy fields will perceive lower 
direct politicization and higher managerial autonomy. 
 
Fourth, we assume that a public manager´s position influences the way how he 
or she perceives politicization and autonomy. Top level people are expected to 
experience high managerial autonomy, but also high direct politicization – if politicians 
interfere, they do it through the top. Political appointments also happen more at the top 
than at lower levels (Kopecký et al. 2012). For politicization, we assume that political 
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pressure works primarily through the top officials, meaning that lower ranked officials 
are shielded from direct political influence by their superior. For managerial autonomy, 
we assume that higher ranked officials experience more autonomy, whereas lower ones 
face more constraints. We also assume top officials develop ways of dealing with 
outside influence, and that when they have a good working relationship with their 
principal, they can craft more autonomy. This follows Lonti´s (2005) argument that 
politicians want to avoid risk when granting autonomy. 
H4a: Higher-positioned top public sector managers in an organization perceive 
more managerial autonomy but also higher direct politicization. 
H4b: Public managers who frequently interact with their political principal 
perceive to have higher managerial autonomy. 
 
The four sets of hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. Size and policy fields 
are for instance related, and agency status is related to policy field. Hence the need for 
testing them simultaneously. We do not have prior expectations about differences in the 
size of the effects. The literature is silent about this, with the exception of Kopecký et 
al. (2016) who found variation in politicization between policy sectors to be lower than 
that between agencies and ministries.  
 
Data 
We use data from the COCOPS Top Public Executive Survey. This is a unique 
open access dataset based on a survey of central government top managers in ministries 
and agencies in a series of European countries (See Hammerschmid et al. 2016 for 
details). The survey targeted the entire population of the top three levels of managers 
(positions comparable to that of secretary-general, director-general and director) in 
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central government administration. In Germany and Spain, also regional levels have 
been included. Respondents were identified by a national research team in each of the 
countries following a shared mapping template. This resulted in a sampling frame in 
these 15 countries of 19.053 senior public sector executives. The national research 
teams also collected contact information and decided on the best possible approach to 
stimulate responses. In most countries high-level endorsement from government bodies 
or leading civil servants was sought to stimulate response. This focus on the top three 
levels corresponds to the approach taken by Evans and Rauch (1999) in their study of 
civil service Weberianness, but stops short of Meyer-Sahling and Veer´s (2012) focus 
on the top four management levels in CEE countries in their study of senior civil service 
politicization.  
The COCOPS survey used a standardised instrument translated in the local 
language, and was administered electronically. Some research teams also employed 
paper-based questionnaires either for the entire survey or as a non-response follow up. 
Total average response rate for the countries included in this article was 29,8%, which 
is high given the type of population. A detailed breakdown of the sampling frame and 
response rates can be found in Appendix B. A total of 4.489 answers were collected on 
politicization and 5.002 on management autonomy. The sample is lower for 
politicization because respondents have been given the explicit option to indicate they 
are not able to assess this, whereas this option was not available when answering the 
questions on autonomy. The survey does not claim full representativeness for the data 
but can be regarded as a good proxy. Detailed checks on representativeness were not 
possible because of very strict confidentiality requirements when surveying these top 
decision makers. For this reason, we could also not collect additional information about 
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the respondents´ organization beyond that what was asked in the survey. Detailed 
information on the fieldwork per country is available in Hammerschmid et al. (2013). 
 
Using perceptions to study variation in direct politicization and managerial 
autonomy 
This article uses perception data to study variation in direct politicization and 
managerial autonomy based on the perceptions of top public managers. Measuring 
direct politicization or patronage is particularly difficult in systems where political 
appointments do not formally exists, unlike e.g. the United States´ spoils system. In 
systems such as the latter, politicization as occurring through direct political 
appointments is arguably ´easier´ to study because of its official and overt character 
(see e.g. Lewis, 2010; Krause et al., 2006). There is a longer tradition in the field of 
relying on perceptions rather than on other sources of data, because of the 
inaccessibility of such data (Charron et al., 2016). Examples of such perception-based 
work are the work by Mayntz & Derlien (1989) who collected attitudes to politicization 
among German top civil servants, Bauer and Ege´s (2012) study of perceptions of 
middle and senior-level European Commission officials (2012) on the importance of 
party affiliation and ideology, or Bellò & Spano´s (2015) survey of Italian public 
managers about their perception of political influence in, amongst others, decision 
making and promotion, where they found pervasive direct politicization. Related work 
asked about senior American Federal government officials´ perception of mechanisms 
of political influence, and the main actors exerting influence (Waterman et al., 1998; 
Furlong, 1998). This article measures direct politicization or patronage in relation to 
senior-level appointments as perceived by top public managers. This means we are 
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primarily interested in patronage intended to control administrative bodies, and less in 
patronage as a material incentive for party supporters (Di Mascio, 2013) 
Measuring managerial autonomy is also difficult, because formal autonomy, as 
established in legal documents or organizational configurations, is not the same as de 
facto autonomy (Yesilkagit & Van Thiel, 2008; Maggetti, 2007). Scholars have mainly 
depended on perception studies in order to get a more accurate picture of managerial 
autonomy on the field (Maggetti & Verhoest, 2014). A major initiative in this respect 
has been the COBRA network (Comparative Public Organization Data Base for 
Research and Analysis) which organized surveys on organizational autonomy in 
government agencies in European countries. Other studies have looked more broadly 
at management autonomy and how it is perceived, yet focused on single countries 
(Lonti, 2005; Hall et al., 2011; Hoque et al., 2004). This work for instance found 
differences in autonomy perceptions depending on the centre/periphery position of the 
organization, its agency status, and the extent of strong organized interests in the 
organizational environment. 
 
Operationalization 
Direct politicization 
In line with the literature on politicization used in the introductory sections of 
this article (Peters & Pierre, 2004; Bauer & Ege, 2012), we will work with a variable 
that is conceptually closests to the direct politicization as we want to measure it, and 
one that is relevant for a group of respondents who are top public sector managers: 
‘What is your view on the following statement: Politicians regularly influence senior-
level appointments in my organization’ (1. Strongly disagree / 7. Strongly agree)i. 
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Managerial autonomy 
Perceived managerial autonomy was measured by asking respondents to 
indicate whether they had a lot of autonomy in six areas: budget allocations; contracting 
out of services; promoting staff; hiring staff; dismissing of removing staff; and making 
changes in the structure of the organization. Respondents could answer using a Likert 
scale ranging from very low autonomy (1) to very high autonomy (7). We specifically 
asked for respondents´ own perspective, rather than about their organization´s formal 
autonomy. Despite the conceptual variation of the items, all six items load on a single 
factor explaining 59,6% of total variance (Cronbach´s Alpha = .864), and for this reason 
items were combined into a new managerial autonomy index using factor scores. 
 
Independent variables 
Respondents could themselves indicate to which policy field their organization 
belongs. Because of the complex tasks of many public organizations, they could 
indicate more than one field. Organization size is a self-report of the number of 
employees working for the organization the respondent belongs to. The agency variable 
captures whether the organization the respondent works for is a ministry or an agency, 
based on a simple self-report Because the main purpose of the survey was not to study 
organizational differences, further differentiation of agency types is not available. 
Respondents were also asked which position they occupy within the organization: the 
top, the second or the third hierarchical level. Finally we asked how often they typically 
interact with their responsible minister, on a six-point scale ranging from never to daily. 
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Control variables 
To control for sociodemographic differences in answering behavior and for 
nonresponse patterns, a number of individual-level control variables have been added. 
The respondent´s age in three categories, gender, and number of years working in the 
public sector. Because of the type of respondents (high level bureaucrats) and the 
sensitivity of some of the questions, we expected many respondent to refuse providing 
socio-demographic information. For this reason these items were inserted at the end of 
the questionnaire. We also created a missing category on each of the socio-demographic 
variables and added this to the estimation in order to maximize the total N of the models, 
rather than introducing other types of biases through data imputation or list-wise case 
removal of in between 11.1 and 12.7 per cent. Country fixed effects are added using 
country dummies. No further country-level variables were added because this article´s 
focus is not on explaining country differences. 
 
Descriptive findings: country-level data for direct politicization and managerial 
autonomy 
Before proceeding to the main analysis, we first present descriptive findings in 
the form of country-level data for direct politicization and managerial autonomy.  
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Figure 1: Perceived direct politicization  
 
 
Politicians regularly influence senior level appointments in my organization, 1=totally 
disagree, 7=totally agree.  
 
 
Figure 1 shows that direct politicization as perceived by central government top 
public managers is highest in Portugal and Spain as well as in Croatia. It is lowest in 
most Nordic country as well the Netherlands and Ireland. A similar patterns emerges 
when looking at perceived managerial autonomy. Top public managers in the 
Netherlands perceive to have the highest managerial autonomy of all countries included 
in the study, followed by those in the Nordic countries, except Finland. Perceived 
managerial autonomy is the lowest in the Southern European countries Spain, Portugal 
and Italy.  
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Figure 2: Managerial autonomy index 
 
Managerial autonomy index – 6 items, 1=very low autonomy, 7=very high autonomy.  
 
 
Correlation between the managerial autonomy index and the direct 
politicization variable is high (r = -.342, p <.001) at the individual level (equal country 
weights applied), and even higher at the country level (r = -.669, p <.01). Yet, as we 
have mentioned above, the two form different dimensions. Patterns are comparable, but 
there are some noteworthy differences between both indicators. Managers in Ireland for 
instance experience relatively low autonomy, but this is not matched by high 
politicization. A country such as Sweden combines very high managerial autonomy 
with, in comparison, relatively higher levels of politicization.  
 
 
Analysis: Explaining variance 
We subsequently ran two separate linear regressions with perceived 
politicization and perceived managerial autonomy as dependent variables. 
Politicization is a sensitive topic. For this reason, even in an anonymous survey, 
respondents often decide not to answer such questions. This was especially the case in 
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some countries included in the survey. Hungary, Lithuania, and Serbia were not 
included in the analysis because of high item nonresponse. Poland and the UK were not 
included because not all relevant independent variables had been included in the survey 
questionnaire in these countries. Nevertheless, a robust multi-country dataset remains. 
Findings are reported in table 1. There were no indications for multicollinearity 
problems as reflected in the VIFs. A table in the appendix reports correlations between 
the independent variables. There are many similarities but also differences between the 
models for politicization and managerial autonomy. The first major difference is that 
the explained variance of the managerial autonomy model is considerably higher - even 
double - than that of the politicization model. We discuss the findings below. 
 
Table 1: Linear regression on perceived direct politicization and managerial autonomy 
 perceived politicization 
perceived managerial 
autonomy 
  ẞ S.E. ẞ S.E. 
agency status (H1) -0,904 0,082*** 0,290 0,031*** 
org. size (ref. is < 100) (H2)         
org size is between 100 and 499 0,092 0,090 0,034 0,034 
org size is between 500 and 999 0,067 0,109 0,035 0,041 
org size is 1000 or more 0,007 0,097 0,135 0,036*** 
policy field (H3)         
infrastructure, env., agriculture, transportation 0,023 0,088 0,120 0,033*** 
finance and economic affairs -0,298 0,083*** 0,033 0,031 
general government, foreign affairs 0,082 0,083 0,016 0,031 
employment, health, social prot., welfare 0,156 0,084 0,010 0,031 
education, recreation, culture, religion -0,122 0,095 0,031 0,035 
other -0,118 0,082 0,025 0,031 
justice, public order, safety, defence 0,089 0,092 0,054 0,034 
hierarchical level (ref. is first) (H4a)         
    second  0,582 0,084*** -0,462 0,032*** 
    third 0,938 0,097*** -0,771 0,037*** 
interaction freq. w. responsible minister (H4b) -0,037 0,026 0,083 0,010*** 
     
control variables         
sex (ref. is male)         
resp is female -0,015 0,067 -0,046 0,025 
sex is missing 0,136 0,224 -0,140 0,083 
age (ref. is 45 or less)         
age 46-55 0,161 0,090 0,015 0,034 
age over 55 0,244 0,103* -0,043 0,039 
age is missing 0,053 0,315 0,088 0,112 
public sector experience (ref. is 20 years +)         
less than 5 years public sector experience 0,022 0,143 0,185 0,053*** 
5-10 year public sector experience 0,428 0,128** 0,054 0,047 
10-20 year public sector experience 0,124 0,085 0,038 0,032 
public sector experience not indicated -0,180 0,226 0,126 0,083 
country dummies (ref. is Finland)         
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Germany 0,837 0,141*** -0,169 0,054** 
France 0,669 0,139*** -0,290 0,053*** 
Spain 1,842 0,160*** -0,574 0,061*** 
Italy 1,037 0,196*** -0,863 0,073*** 
Estonia 0,411 0,155** 0,061 0,056 
Norway 0,169 0,150 0,302 0,054*** 
Austria 1,397 0,135*** -0,406 0,051*** 
Portugal 2,249 0,178*** -1,105 0,066*** 
Ireland -0,961 0,144*** -0,713 0,053*** 
Sweden 0,870 0,132*** 0,566 0,048*** 
Iceland -1,363 0,177*** 0,194 0,067** 
Croatia 1,917 0,199*** -0,548 0,074*** 
The Netherlands -0,638 0,176*** 0,532 0,066*** 
Denmark 0,826 0,097*** 0,278 0,072*** 
(Constant) 3,424 0,226*** 0,187 0,084* 
N 4.255   4.621   
adjusted R2 0,283   0,418   
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
Findings for direct politicization 
As expected (H1a), respondents working for an agency rather than a department 
perceive less direct politicization. They work at a structural distance from political 
actors, making interference harder. This confirms Kopecký et al. (2016)´s study, as well 
as the work by Di Mascio (2013)which found stronger patronage in ministries than in 
executing institutions. Organization size does not appear to have an effect (H2a). An 
explanation for this could be that there are in fact two potentially competing processes 
at work: large organizations attract political attention, yet are also harder to meddle 
with. There is just one policy field effect (H3). Managers working the field of economic 
affairs and finance report less politicization,. This is a highly technical field. This 
finding is again consistent with Kopecký et al. (2016), who found that public finance is 
often depoliticized. Still, no effect was found for equally technical fields, or for welfare 
policy where more politicization was expected. . Respondents lower in the hierarchy 
(i.e. below level one) perceive more politicization, and perceptions of politicization 
increase as respondents sit lower in the hierarchy. This is contrary to our hypothesis 
H4a that suggested that higher level managers shield lower levels from politicization. 
Likely explanations are that having intense contacts with politicians (as is the case for 
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the highest ranked managers) changes the perception of politicians and their actions. 
Politicians interfering is perhaps seen as the normal way of interaction between politics 
and administration rather than as politicization. An alternative explanation is that the 
highest hierarchical levels do not even notice politicization anymore, through 
habituation, or because they have been appointed for political reasons and therefore see 
political interference as legitimate. A third explanation could be that managers at the 
highest level frequently invoke fake political pressure in order to strengthen compliance 
by their managers at level two and three, thereby influencing lower-level managers 
perception of political interference.  
 
Findings for managerial autonomy 
The model for managerial autonomy has an adjusted R2 of .418, which is very 
high. There are some clear findings related to structural factors. Managers working in 
agencies also report more autonomy (H1b), which directly follows from the formal 
raison d´être of agencies. Public managers working for very large organizations report 
more managerial autonomy, thereby partially confirming H2b. H2b only holds for very 
large organizations (>1000 employees), and not for other large organizations. The size 
effect can be explained in different ways. One is that their size allows them to capture 
and enforce their own autonomy vis-à-vis other actors, such as political principals or 
ministries responsible for finance and HR. It can also signal that very large 
organizations have more capacity to organize their own in-house processes regarding 
finance and HR. Just one policy field effect was found. Respondents active in the highly 
technical policy fields of infrastructure, environment, transport and agriculture report 
higher managerial autonomy (H3b). The position of the respondent clearly matters 
Respondents at the top of an organization experience considerably higher managerial 
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autonomy compared to those sitting at the second of third hierarchical level (H4a). In a 
way, this is logical, because the number one of an organization is in the end responsible 
for the overall management, while the number two and three fall under the top manager. 
We also find that managers reporting a high interaction frequency with their responsible 
minister experience higher managerial autonomy (H4b). This could suggest absence of 
adversarial political-administrative relations among this group. 
Among the control variables, one surprising finding stands out. Managers with 
very low public sector experience (< five years) report significantly more managerial 
autonomy than those who have been working for the public sector most of their lives. 
This is a relatively small group of around seven per cent of the entire sample. There are 
two potential explanations for this. One is that these managers have been attracted from 
the outside with a specific mandate, and have for this reason been given very high 
autonomy. An alternative explanation is that these managers had very low expectations 
of managerial autonomy and expected considerable red tape within government before 
joining the public sector and were pleasantly surprised to find this was not the case. 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
This article presented novel data for direct politicization and managerial 
autonomy for a set of European countries. These show considerable variation across 
Europe. Using data from a survey among top public managers, four sets of explanations 
for the variance were tested. Overall, our findings confirm earlier studies on managerial 
autonomy and direct politicization (see, e.g. Verhoest et al., 2011; Kopecký et al., 2016; 
Lonti, 2005; Hall et al., 2011). Overall, though, our main lines of explanation appear to 
be better able to explain the variation in managerial autonomy than that in direct 
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politicization. Several of the effects are also different across the models, confirming 
that (lack of) managerial autonomy and c politicization are different concepts.  
First, there is a clear structural effect. Top public managers working in agencies 
report higher managerial autonomy and lower politicization. This is entirely what was 
expected, and also follows logically from the nature of public sector agencies. An effect 
of organization size is absent for politicization, and in the autonomy model a size effect 
was only found for managers working in very large organizations 
We found limited and mixed effects of policy field, in both the autonomy and 
politicization models. While the limited effects we did find were in line with 
expectations, the findings are difficult to interpret or generalize. Working in more 
technical policy fields appears to be related to an experience of higher autonomy and 
less politicization, but the effect does not hold in a consistent way across the two 
models. Contrary to our expectations, no effect was found related to working in welfare 
policy fields. An explanation for this could be the high level of aggregation of policy 
field affiliation in the data and the difficulty of establishing how salient or politically 
visible a field is. Kopecký et al. (2016) for instance suggested that a field becomes more 
salient for politicization when higher opportunities for political graft and corruption 
exist (e.g. in industrial policy) whereas Verhoest et al., (2011: 215) defined salience 
mainly in terms of the impact of a policy or organization on citizens. Such competing 
approaches to salience make it hard to interpret statistical effects. 
Public managers at the top of an organization experience both high managerial 
autonomy and low direct politicization, whereas managers at lower levels experience 
lower autonomy and higher politicization. This is straightforward to explain for 
managerial autonomy as we have indicated earlier and in line with the hypotheses, but 
more puzzling for politicization. One explanation could be that a high percentage of top 
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managers at level one have been appointed politically. The alternative is that they have 
gotten used to political interference and have found ways of dealing with this while 
lower level managers have much less flexibility when it comes to dealing with or 
ignoring political demands. In this respect, a finding worth exploring is that when 
managers report a higher frequency of interaction with their responsible minister, they 
perceive more autonomy. There are number of potential explanations. This can indicate 
the existence of a good working relationship resulting in a well-functioning public 
service bargain. It can however also be interpreted as an indication that top managers 
have been appointed politically, and that for this reason they do not consider political 
interventions as politicization, and that their autonomy is normal given that control by 
the principal is already exercised trough political channels: 
 
This study has a number of weaknesses. Only perceived managerial autonomy 
and perceived direct politicization have been measured, not formal managerial 
autonomy or actual direct politicization. An advantage of our approach is that we in this 
way are able to look beyond formal dimensions of autonomy, and capture autonomy as 
it is actually experienced. Perception measures of direct politicization help us move 
beyond analysis of formal politicization or expert surveys. Measurement of the 
dependent variables could be an explanation for the differences in the explained 
variance between the models. Measurement of managerial autonomy was more specific 
than that of politicization. Managerial autonomy was measured by inquiring after fairly 
specific and concrete actions, such as hiring people or allocating budgets. The 
measurement of direct politicization relied on a less specific survey item, using words 
such as ‘regularly influence’. This makes the politicization variable more of a 
judgement rather than an observation of fact, resulting in more random variation. 
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Despite these shortcoming, the use of multiple items to measure  managerial 
autonomy, in combination with the massive population-based sample this article 
responded to calls for better measurement of politicization and autonomy (see, e.g., 
Fukuyama, 2013). Further research should also consider adding additional control 
variables such as variables looking at organization task type (see e.g. Lonti, 2005; Van 
Thiel & Yesilkagit, 2014), at organization type (distinguishing between different types 
of agencies), or at political context variables such as government composition, the party 
landscape, party competition, distance from the nearest election or frequency of 
alternations in government composition (see Meyer-Sahling & Veen, 2012). It could 
also move beyond our country fixed effects approach taken in this paper and start 
explaining the large country effects found within this survey of top public sector 
managers. 
 
  
Managerial autonomy and direct politicization 
  24 
References 
Alford, J., Hartley, J., Yates, S., & Hughes, O. (2016). Into the purple zone: 
Deconstructing the politics/administration distinction. American Review of 
Public Administration, online first, DOI: 10.1177/0275074016638481. 
Antonsen, M., & Jørgensen, T.B. (1997). The ‘publicness’ of public organizations. 
Public Administration, 75(2), 337-357. 
Bauer, M. W., & Ege, J. (2012). Politicization within the European Commission’s 
bureaucracy. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 78(3), 403-424. 
Bellò, B., & Spano, A. (2015). Governing the purple zone: How politicians influence 
public managers. European Management Journal, 33(5), 354-365. 
Charron, N., Dahlström, C., & Lapuente, V. (2016). Measuring meritocracy in the 
public sector in Europe: A new national and sub-national indicator. European 
Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 22(3), 499-523. 
Christensen, J. (2001). Bureaucratic autonomy as a political asset. In: Peters, B.G. & 
Pierre, P. (eds). Politicians, bureaucrats and administrative reform, London: 
Routledge, pp 119-131. 
Christensen, J. G., Klemmensen, R., & Opstrup, N. (2014). Politicization and the 
replacement of top civil servants in Denmark. Governance, 27(2), 215-241. 
Christensen, T., & Laegreid, P. (2001). New Public Management: The effects of 
contractualism and devolution on political control. Public Management Review, 
3(1), 73-94. 
Dahlström, C., & Lapuente, V. (2010). Explaining cross-country differences in 
performance-related pay in the public sector. Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory, 20(3), 577-600. 
Managerial autonomy and direct politicization 
  25 
Dahlström, C., & Pierre, J. (2011). Steering the Swedish state: Politicization as a 
coordination strategy. In: Dahlström, C., Peters, B.G., & Pierre, J. (eds) Steering 
from the centre: Strengthening political control in Western democracies, 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp. 193-211. 
Dahlström, C., Teorell, J., Dahlberg, S., Hartmann, F., Lindberg, A., & Nistotskaya, M. 
(2015). The QoG Expert Survey Dataset II. University of Gothenburg: The 
Quality of Government InstituteDi Mascio, F. (2013). Exploring the link 
between patronage and party institutionalization: an historical-institutional 
analysis of the Italian transition. Democratization, 21(4), 678-698. 
 
Egeberg, M., & Trondal, J. (2009). Political leadership and bureaucratic autonomy: 
Effects of agencification. Governance, 22(4), 673–688. 
Evans, P. & Rauch, J.E. (1999). Bureaucracy and growth: a cross-national analysis of 
the effects of Weberian state structures on economic growth. American 
Sociological Review, 64(5), 748–765. 
Flinders, M., & Buller, J. (2006). Depoliticisation: Principles, tactics and tools. British 
Politics, 1(3), 293-318. 
Fukuyama, F. (2013). What is governance? Governance, 26(3), 347-368. 
Furlong, S. R. (1998). Political influence on the bureaucracy: The bureaucracy speaks. 
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 8(1), 39-65. 
Gherghina, S., & Kopecký, P. (2016). Politicization of administrative elites in Western 
Europe: an introduction. Acta Politica, 51(4), 407-412. 
Hall, P., Nilsson, T., & Löfgren, K. (2011). Bureaucratic autonomy revisited: informal 
aspects of agency autonomy in Sweden. Paper presented at the annual 
Managerial autonomy and direct politicization 
  26 
conference of the European Group for Public Administration (Bucharest: 7-10 
September). 
Hammerschmid, G., Oprisor, A., Štimac, V. (2013). COCOPS Executive Survey on 
Public Sector Reform in Europe: Research Report. Rotterdam: Erasmus 
University Rotterdam. 
Hammerschmid, G., Van de Walle, S., Andrews, R. & Bezes, P. (eds)(2016). Public 
administration reforms in Europe. The view from the top. Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar. 
Hood, C. (2001). Public service bargains and public service reform. In: Peters, B.G. & 
Pierre, P. (eds). Politicians, bureaucrats and administrative reform, London: 
Routledge, pp 13-23 
Hood, C. (2010). The blame game: Spin, bureaucracy, and self-preservation in 
government. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Hoque, K., Davis, S., & Humphreys, M. (2004). Freedom to do what you are told: senior 
management team autonomy in an NHS acute trust. Public Administration, 
82(2), 355-375. 
James, O., & Thiel, S. V. (2011). Structural devolution and agencification. In 
Christensen, T., & Lægreid, P. (Eds). The Ashgate research companion to new 
public management. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 209-222 
James, O., Jilke, S., Petersen, C., & Van de Walle, S. (2016). Citizens' blame of 
politicians for public service failure: Experimental evidence about blame 
reduction through delegation and contracting. Public Administration Review, 
76(1), 83-93. 
Kettl, D. F. (1997). The global revolution in public management: Driving themes, 
missing links. Journal of Policy Analysis and management, 16(3): 446-462. 
Managerial autonomy and direct politicization 
  27 
Kopecky, P., Mair, P., & Spirova, M. (eds)(2012). Party patronage and party 
government in European democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kopecký, P., Meyer Sahling, J. H., Panizza, F., Scherlis, G., Schuster, C., & Spirova, 
M. (2016). Party patronage in contemporary democracies: Results from an 
expert survey in 22 countries from five regions. European Journal of Political 
Research, 55(2), 416-431. 
Krause, G. A., Lewis, D. E., & Douglas, J. W. (2006). Political appointments, civil 
service systems, and bureaucratic competence: Organizational balancing and 
executive branch revenue forecasts in the American states. American Journal of 
Political Science, 50(3), 770-787. 
Lewis, D. E. (2010). The politics of presidential appointments: Political control and 
bureaucratic performance. Princeton University Press. 
Lioukas, S., Bourantas, D., & Papadakis, V. (1993). Managerial autonomy of state-
owned enterprises: Determining factors. Organization Science, 4(4), 645-666. 
Lonti, Z. (2005). How much decentralization? Managerial autonomy in the Canadian 
public service. American Review of Public Administration, 35(2), 122-136. 
Maggetti, M. (2007) De facto independence after delegation: A fuzzy-set analysis. 
Regulation & Governance, 1(4), 271–294. 
Maggetti, M., & Verhoest, K. (2014). Unexplored aspects of bureaucratic autonomy: a 
state of the field and ways forward. International Review of Administrative 
Sciences, 80(2), 239-256. 
Majone, G. (2001). Two logics of delegation agency and fiduciary relations in EU 
governance. European Union Politics, 2(1), 103-122. 
Managerial autonomy and direct politicization 
  28 
Mayntz, R., & Derlien, H. U. (1989). Party patronage and politicization of the West 
German administrative elite 1970–1987‐ Toward hybridization? Governance, 
2(4), 384-404. 
Meyer-Sahling, J. H., & Veen, T. (2012). Governing the post-communist state: 
government alternation and senior civil service politicisation in Central and 
Eastern Europe. East European Politics, 28(1), 4-22. 
Norman, R. (2001). Letting and making managers manage: the effect of control systems 
on management action in New Zealand’s central government. International 
Public Management Journal, 4(1), 65-89. 
Peters, B. G. (2013). Politicisation: What is it and why should we care? In Neuhold, C., 
Vanhoonacker, S., & Verhey, L. (eds). Civil Servants and Politics. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan UK, pp. 12-24. 
Peters, B.G., & Pierre, J. (eds)(2004). The politicization of the civil service in 
comparative perspective: A quest for control. London: Routledge. 
Pollitt, C., & Bouckaert, G. (2004). Public management reform: A comparative 
analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Rouban, L. (2003). Politicization of the civil service. In: Peters, B.G., & Pierre, J. (eds) 
Handbook of Public Administration. London: Sage, pp. 199–210. 
Spence, D. B. (1997). Agency policy making and political control: Modeling away the 
delegation problem. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 
7(2), 199-219. 
Suleiman, E. N. (2013). Dismantling democratic states. Princeton University Press. 
Svara, J. H. (2001). The myth of the dichotomy: Complementarity of politics and 
administration in the past and future of public administration. Public 
Administration Review, 61(2), 176-183. 
Managerial autonomy and direct politicization 
  29 
Van de Walle, S. (2016). Reforming organizational structures. In: Van de Walle, S. & 
S. Groeneveld, S. (eds). Theory and practice of public sector reform, London: 
Routledge, pp. 131-143 
Van Thiel, S., Verhoest, K., Bouckaert, G. & Laegreid; P. (2012). Lessons and 
recommendations for the practice of agencifiation. In: Verhoest, K., Van Thiel, 
S., Bouckaert, G., & Lægreid, P. (Eds). Government agencies: practices and 
lessons from 30 countries. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 413-439. 
Van Thiel, S., & Yesilkagit, K. (2014). Does task matter? The effect of task on the 
establishment, autonomy and control of semi-autonomous agencies. 
International Review of Administrative Sciences, 80(2): 318-340. 
Verhoest, K., Peters, B. G., Bouckaert, G., & Verschuere, B. (2004). The study of 
organisational autonomy: a conceptual review. Public Administration and 
Development, 24(2), 101-118. 
Verhoest, K., Roness, P. G., Verschuere, B., Rubecksen, K., & MacCarthaigh, M. 
(2010). Autonomy and control of state agencies: Comparing states and agencies. 
Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Waterman, R. W., Rouse, A., & Wright, R. (1998). The venues of influence: A new 
theory of political control of the bureaucracy. Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory, 8(1), 13-38. 
Yesilkagit, K., & Van Thiel, S. (2008). Political influence and bureaucratic autonomy. 
Public Organization Review, 8(2), 137-153. 
  
Managerial autonomy and direct politicization 
  30 
Appendix A. Individual items used for the construction of the dependent 
variables 
Managerial autonomy 
In my position, I have the following degree of decision autonomy with regard to  
1. Budget allocations  
2. Contracting out services  
3. Promoting staff  
4. Hiring staff  
5. Dismissing or removing staff  
6. Changes in the structure of my organization 
(1. Very low autonomy / 7. Very high autonomy) 
 
Direct politicization 
What is your view on the following statements: 
1. Politicians regularly influence senior-level appointments in my organization  
 (1. Strongly disagree / 7. Strongly agree / Cannot assess) 
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Appendix B. Responses per country 
Country Invitations 
sent 
Response Response 
rate 
Austria 1.407 493 35,0% 
Croatia 650 176 27,1% 
Denmark 758 147 19,4% 
Estonia 913 318 34,8% 
Finland 1.742 703 40,4% 
France 3.403 587 17,2% 
Germany 1.955 445 22,8% 
Iceland 392 200 51,0% 
Ireland 980 375 38,3% 
Italy 971 172 17,7% 
Norway 1.197 334 27,9% 
Portugal 1.038 296 28,5% 
Spain 1.684 297 17,6% 
Sweden 1.293 523 40,4% 
The Netherlands 670 196 29,3% 
Total 19.053 5.262 
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Appendix C. Descriptive statistics 
  
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Direct politicization 4489 1 7 4,10 2,31 
managerial autonomy index 5002 -1,72828 2,14778 0,02 1,00 
top hierarchical level 5069 0,00 1,00 0,24 0,42 
second hierarchical level 5069 0,00 1,00 0,43 0,50 
third hierarchical level 5069 0,00 1,00 0,33 0,47 
org size is smaller than 100 5213 0,00 1,00 0,20 0,40 
org size is between 100 and 499 5213 0,00 1,00 0,40 0,49 
org size is between 500 and 999 5213 0,00 1,00 0,13 0,33 
org size is 1000 or more 5213 0,00 1,00 0,28 0,45 
Ministry 5262 0,00 1,00 0,42 0,49 
Agency 5262 0,00 1,00 0,51 0,50 
policy field infrastructure, environment, 
agriculture, transportation 
5262 0,00 1,00 0,15 0,36 
policy field finance and economic affairs 5262 0,00 1,00 0,20 0,40 
policy field general government, foreign 
affairs 
5262 0,00 1,00 0,21 0,41 
policy field employment, health, social 
protection and welfare 
5262 0,00 1,00 0,25 0,43 
policy field education, recreation, culture, 
religion 
5262 0,00 1,00 0,14 0,35 
policy field other 5262 0,00 1,00 0,17 0,38 
policy field justice, public order, safety, 
defence 
5262 0,00 1,00 0,15 0,35 
interaction freq. with responsible minister 5051 1 6 2,60 1,53 
male 5262 0,00 1,00 0,55 0,50 
female 5262 0,00 1,00 0,32 0,47 
sex is missing 5262 0,00 1,00 0,13 0,33 
45 or younger 5262 0,00 1,00 0,24 0,43 
age 46-55 5262 0,00 1,00 0,35 0,48 
age over 55 5262 0,00 1,00 0,29 0,45 
age is missing 5262 0,00 1,00 0,11 0,32 
less than 5 years public sector experience 5262 0,00 1,00 0,08 0,27 
5-10 year public sector experience 5262 0,00 1,00 0,08 0,27 
10-20 year public sector experience 5262 0,00 1,00 0,28 0,45 
more than 20 year public sector experience 5262 0,00 1,00 0,45 0,50 
public sector experience not indicated 5262 0,00 1,00 0,11 0,32 
Min, max, mean and STD based on weighted data (equal country weights); N based on 
unweighted data. 
 
 
  
Appendix D: Correlation table 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
top hierarchical level 1 
                        
second hierarchical level -,448** 1 
                       
third hierarchical level -,407** -,635** 1 
                      
org size is smaller than 100 ,090** -,038** -,039** 1 
                     
org size is between 100 and 499 0,013 ,034* -,046** -,372** 1 
                    
org size is between 500 and 999 -0,007 -0,010 0,017 -,191** -,323** 1 
                   
org size is 1000 or more -,085** 0,004 ,069** -,301** -,509** -,261** 1 
                  
agency ,077** ,130** -,200** 0,026 -,028* ,050** -,030* 1 
                 
Ministry central -,182** -,072** ,231** -0,004 -0,012 -,053** ,057** -,870** 1 
                
policy field infra, env, etc. 0,020 -0,006 -0,011 -,036** ,035* ,065** -,058** ,034* -,061** 1 
               
policy field finance and economic 
affairs 
-,039** ,029* 0,004 -,045** 0,021 0,009 0,009 -,030* ,030* -,075** 1 
              
policy field general government, 
foreign affairs 
-0,025 0,012 0,010 -0,018 0,023 -0,008 -0,003 -,060** ,089** -,084** -,077** 1 
             
policy field employment, health, 
etc 
-,030* 0,021 0,005 -,030* -,047** -,035* ,103** ,132** -,122** -,143** -,189** -,182** 1 
            
policy field education, recreation, 
culture, religion 
,065** -0,012 -,045** ,101** 0,023 -0,012 -,101** ,040** -,037** -,098** -,149** -,144** -,169** 1 
           
policy field other -0,002 0,007 -0,006 0,018 ,048** ,041** -,099** 0,021 -,050** ,043** -0,006 0,012 -,122** -0,023 1 
          
policy field justice, public order, 
safety, defence 
,076** -0,025 -,040** 0,011 -0,006 -0,005 0,001 -0,017 0,016 -,077** -,128** -,112** -,173** -,127** -,097** 1 
         
Interaction freq.: Responsible 
minister 
,326** -,090** -,190** -0,004 ,103** -0,021 -,090** -,338** ,231** 0,010 -,035* 0,027 -,048** ,031* -,037** ,056** 1 
        
resp is female -,109** ,045** ,048** 0,002 ,039** 0,019 -,058** ,041** -0,009 -,062** -0,013 ,031* ,036** 0,025 ,041** -,069** -,091** 1 
       
resp is male ,124** -,045** -,061** -0,007 -,029* 0,002 ,035* -,027* -0,008 ,060** 0,005 -0,023 -,043** -0,019 -,051** ,086** ,100** -,762** 1 
      
45 or younger -,123** ,033* ,073** -0,020 ,068** -,029* -,033* -,033* ,051** -0,003 ,029* ,041** -,030* -,028* 0,023 -0,007 -,052** ,117** 0,018 1 
     
age 46-55 -0,009 0,009 -0,002 -0,012 -,037** ,030* 0,026 -0,007 0,008 -0,005 -0,002 0,000 -0,001 0,007 -0,005 ,043** 0,000 ,066** ,098** -,416** 1 
    
age over 55 ,144** -,040** -,083** ,031* -0,016 0,011 -0,017 ,048** -,069** 0,013 -,040** -0,025 0,020 0,024 -0,021 -0,016 ,065** -0,013 ,147** -,350** -,490** 1 
   
less than 5 years public sector 
experience 
-0,021 ,074** -,057** 0,011 ,065** -0,016 -,067** 0,016 0,005 -,034* ,062** -0,001 -0,007 0,003 ,033* -,027* -,089** 0,026 -,044** ,122** -0,019 -,111** 1 
  
5-10 year public sector experience -,050** 0,014 ,028* 0,024 ,035* -0,022 -,041** ,046** -,034* 0,011 0,018 -0,021 0,013 -0,008 0,008 -,031* -,031* ,063** 0,007 ,277** -,076** -,109** -,080** 1 
 
10-20 year public sector experience -,070** ,033* 0,027 -0,011 ,067** -,038** -,034* 0,018 0,002 -0,017 -0,002 ,059** 0,015 0,001 0,014 -,032* 0,004 ,105** ,040** ,395** -0,007 -,215** -,163** -,171** 1 
more than 20 year public sector 
experience 
,118** -,067** -,033* -0,007 -,100** ,064** ,063** -,041** 0,005 ,041** -,048** -,032* -0,022 0,006 -,031* ,078** ,061** -0,006 ,204** -,445** ,205** ,426** -,266** -,279** -,570** 
 
 
 
 
 
i The original questionnaire contained three items to measure direct politicization each capturing 
a different dimension of the phenomenon. All were measured using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 
totally disagree to totally agree. Although the three items load on a single factor for the entire dataset, 
explaining 46,3% of variance, the Cronbach´s Alpha remains low, and separate analysis on the individual 
countries shows that in the Netherlands and Denmark, two clearly distinct factors emerge, which are 
furthermore different across these two countries. This means there are cross-country validity issues with 
the scale. While this is in itself worth examining further, it is not the purpose of this article. 
                                                 
